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SECTION 1983 AND THE LIMITS OF PROSECUTORIAL
IMMUNITY
Hampton v. Hanrahan
600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
48 U.S.L.W. 3780 (U.S. June 2, 1980)
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, presently codified at 42

U.S.C. § 1983,' permits any individual to bring a civil action for damages 2 against any person who, acting under color of state law, 3 deprived
the individual of rights secured by the United States Constitution and
laws. The language of the statute appears to apply without exception to
all persons acting under color of state law, regardless of their official
position. In 1951, however, the United States Supreme Court, in Tenney v. Brandhove,4 concluded that Congress had not intended that section 1983 should abrogate official immunities "well grounded in history
' 5
and reason.
In Tenney, the Supreme Court found an absolute immunity from
section 1983 damages liability for state legislators acting in a traditional
legislative capacity. 6 The Supreme Court later held judges to be absolutely immune from section 1983 damages liability for acts performed
within their judicial jurisdiction.7 In 1mbler v. Pachtman,8 the Supreme
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) [hereinafter referred to and cited as section 19831 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
2. Section 1983 also provides for equitable relief. See S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL
LIBERTIES LITIGATION ch. 5 (1979) [hereinafter cited as NAHMOD].

3. The United States Supreme Court has held that the "under color" of state law requirement contained in section 1983 is the same as the state action required under the fourteenth
amendment. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966).
4. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
5. Id at 376.
6. Id at 379. Absolute immunity also has been extended to regional legislators. Lake
Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979).
Absolute immunity as conferred in Tenney, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), and Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), includes only immunity from damages liability. Injunctive or
declaratory relief is still available to the successful section 1983 plaintiff. Briggs v. Goodwin, 569
F.2d 10, 15 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1977); NAHMOD, supra note 2, at 191, 216.
7. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). The
Supreme Court in Sparkman reiterated the distinction between acts in excess of jurisdiction and
the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Only in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, the Court held,
will a judge lose his absolute immunity. For a general discussion ofjudicial immunity, see Rosenberg, Stump v. Sparkman.- The Doctrine ofJudicialImpunity, 64 VA. L. REV. 833 (1978); Note,

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

Court extended absolute immunity to prosecuting attorneys but expressly limited the immunity to a prosecutor's actions in connection
with his advocacy function. 9 Imbler did not define the precise limits of
the advocacy function, 10 and left open the issue of whether absolute
immunity attached to a prosecutor's other functions."
Hampton v. Hanrahan12 presented the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit with an opportunity to delineate the outer

limits of a prosecuting attorney's absolute immunity from liability for
damages under section 1983. The Seventh Circuit dealt with a complex
factual situation in Hampton.' 3 The litigation which led to the Seventh

Circuit's decision was protracted,' 4 often sensational, and legally signif-

5
icant in several respects.'

This comment will address only the issue in Hampton of the extension of immunity to prosecutors and federal officials in section 1983
suits for damages. First, the comment will examine the development of
section 1983 immunities and the difficulties that the multiple roles of a
prosecuting attorney present in determining the parameters of
prosecutorial immunity. Next, the relevant factual and legal background of Hampton will be examined. This comment will then assess
the Seventh Circuit's immunity analysis in Hampton and show that the
court correctly refused to extend absolute immunity to federal law enforcement officials, and to a state prosecutor's "publicity campaigns"
Immunity of Federaland State Judgesfrom Civil Suit-Timefor a Qualyied Immunity;, 27 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 727 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Immunily of Federaland State Judges].
8. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
9. Id at 430-31. See text accompanying notes 51-59 infra.
10. 424 U.S. at 431 n.33.
11. ld at 430-31. Unlike legislators and judges, a prosecutor performs many functions, including investigation, prosecution, administration, and direction of law enforcement. Id See
NAHMOD, supra note 2, at 220-24; Note, Delimiting the Scope of ProsecutorialImmunityfrom Section 1983 Damage Suits, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 173, 187-88 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Delimitingthe
Scope of ProsecutorialImmunity].
12. 600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3780 (U.S. June 2, 1980). The
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on all issues except the attorney's fees awarded to
the plaintiffs by the Seventh Circuit. The Court, in a per curiam opinion, reversed the award of
attorney's fees, holding that the plaintiffs were not a "prevailing party" within the meaning of the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). 48 U.S.L.W. at 3780.
Justice Powell, joined by Justices Burger and Rehnquist, dissented from the denial of certiorari as
to the federal defendants. Justice Marshall dissented from the summary reversal of the attorney's
fee award, arguing that the issue merited the plenary attention of the Court. Id. at 3783.
13. See text accompanying notes 70-99 infra.
14. The first complaints were filed in 1970. See text accompanying notes 100-07 infra.
15. The Seventh Circuit dealt extensively with the prima facie elements of conspiracy, and
with such issues as the disclosure of informants' identities, imposition of sanctions against defendants and their counsel, the permissible scope of discovery, attorneys' fees, and contempt judgments
imposed on two of plaintiffs' attorneys.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

and participation in planning police raids. 16 Finally, this comment will
demonstrate that the Seventh Circuit's extension of immunity to the

prosecuting attorney's actions in connection with the Chicago Police
Department's internal investigation was incorrect.
SECTION

1983

AND IMMUNITY

HistoricalBackground
Many of the "persons" who are potential defendants in section
1983 actions were immune from suit for their official activities at common law. 17 Despite the absolute language of section 1983, the United
States Supreme Court has extended this traditional immunity to section
1983 suits for damages, holding many officials either absolutely or
18
qualifiedly immune.
Legislative immunity was firmly entrenched at common law 19 and
legislators were the first officials to be granted absolute immunity from
section 1983 damages liability, in Tenney v. Brandhove.20 Sixteen years
later, in Pierson v. Ray,2 1 the Supreme Court extended absolute immu16. 600 F.2d at 631-33.
17. See, e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (legislators); Spalding v. Vilas, 161
U.S. 483 (1896) (executive officials); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880) (legislators);
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1872) (judges); Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(witnesses); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950)
(prosecuting attorneys); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 399, 403 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'dper curiam, 275
U.S. 503 (1927) (grand jurors, witnesses, and prosecuting attorneys); Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind.
117, 44 N.E. 1001 (1896) (grand jury and prosecuting attorneys); Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. &
El. 1, 113-14, 112 E.R. 1112, 1155-56 (1839) (legislators); Agard v. Wilde, J. Brdg. 130, 123 E.R.
1251, 1252 (1617) (grand jurors).
18. See, e.g., Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391
(1979) (regional legislators held to have absolute immunity from section 1983 actions for damages); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (state prison officials held to have qualified
immunity in section 1983 actions for damages); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecuting attorney held to have absolute immunity from section 1983 actions for damages in initiating a prosecution and presenting the State's case); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (school
officials and school board held to have qualified immunity in section 1983 actions for damages);
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (governor and executive officials of a state held to have
qualified immunity in section 1983 claims for damages); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (state
judges held to have absolute immunity from section 1983 actions for damages; local police officers
held to have qualified immunity in section 1983 actions for damages); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367 (1951) (state legislators held to have absolute immunity from section 1983 actions for
damages). For an explanation of the difference between absolute and qualified immunity, see text
accompanying notes 40-42 infra.
19. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-76 (1951); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6; J. NoWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 236-38 (1978).

20. 341 U.S. 367 (1951). Brandhove charged that the contempt proceedings instituted against
him by the California Senate after he refused to testify before the Tenney committee were an
attempt to prevent his exercise of his first amendment rights. The Supreme Court held that section
1983 created no liability for conduct by legislators in an area where they had traditional power to
act.
21. 386 U.S. 547 (1967). Plaintiffs in Pierson were a group of white and black clergymen who
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nity from section 1983 damages liability to state judges. Both the Tenney and Pierson opinions relied heavily on the historical immunity of
22
legislators and judges.
The immunity of federal officials from suit is based on a separate
line of cases. In Spalding v. Vilas,23 the United States Postmaster General was sued for circulating a notice which allegedly injured the plaintiffs reputation. The Supreme Court held that even a malicious motive
would not render the Postmaster General liable in damages for injury
caused by an official act that otherwise was within the scope of his authority. 24 Barr v. Matteo, 25 involving a suit against the director of a
government agency for malicious defamation, reaffirmed this holding
as to federal officials. In Butz v. Economou,26 however, the Supreme
Court held that the immunity established in Spalding and Barr did not
protect a federal official acting in an executive capacity who violated a
statutory or constitutional limitation on his authority.2 7 The Court reasoned that in suits for alleged violations of constitutional rights there
was no basis for extending greater immunity from liability to federal
officials than was extended to their state counterparts in section 1983
cases. 28 State executive officers had been held to have only a qualified
good faith immunity in Scheuer v. Rhodes.29 The Court extended the
Scheuer standard to school administrators in Wood v. Strickland,30 and
to prison officials in Procunier v. Navarelte.3 1 The Butz Court applied
this same qualified, good faith immunity to federal officials performing
comparable functions. 32 Federal officials performing adjudicatory
were arrested when attempting to use a segregated bus terminal waiting room in Mississippi in
1961. The clergymen were convicted by a municipal police justice; on appeal to the county court,
the charges were dropped. The clergymen then sued under section 1983 the police judge and the
officers who arrested them. The Supreme Court held that a judge was not liable under section
1983 even for an unconstitutional conviction.
22. See id at 553-55; 341 U.S. at 372-76.
23. 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
24. Id at 498.
25. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
26. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). The plaintiff in Butz sued the Secretary of Agriculture and other
federal officials, alleging that by instituting unauthorized proceedings to suspend the registration
of his commodity futures commision company the department had violated his constitutional
rights. The Supreme Court held that federal officials were not absolutely immune from liability
for a willful or knowing violation of plaintiffs constitutional rights.
27. Id. at 495. The plaintiffs in Barr alleged defamation, whereas in Butz the plaintiff alleged constitutional deprivations. The Court viewed the distinction as crucial.
28. Id at 500. The Court excluded "exceptional situations where it is demonstrated that
absolute immunity is essential for the conduct of the public business." Id. at 507.
29. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
30. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
31. 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
32. 438 U.S. at 508.
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functions or functions analogous to those of a state prosecutor in initiating and presenting a case, on the other hand, were held to be entitled
33
to absolute immunity because their state counterparts were immune.
The most frequently noted reason for extending immunity from
section 1983 damage suits is that the immunity is necessary to protect
the official's decision making process. 34 Yet to extend absolute immunity to all state officials would negate the very remedy which Congress
sought to create through section 1983. 35 Thus, the Supreme Court has
extended absolute immunity only upon a convincing showing that the
immunity serves an important public interest. 36 While the early immunity cases gave great weight to the official's immunity at common law,
the analysis in later cases concentrated on the effect that threat of suit
would have on the official's performance of his or her duties. 37 In at
least one situation, that of high ranking government executives, the
Supreme Court refused to extend absolute immunity in section 1983
39
cases, 3 8 even though such immunity existed at common law.
The procedural difference between absolute and qualified immunity is significant. Absolute immunity defeats a suit at the outset if the
official's actions were within the scope of his authority. 40 The official's
intent and the legality of his acts are irrelevant.4 ' An official who has
only a qualified immunity, however, must establish at trial that he acted with a good faith belief in the constitutionality or legality of his
42
action and that the belief was reasonable under the circumstances.
33. Id at 513.
34. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 435 (1976). The Court in Scheuer reasoned
that the immunity of government officers rested on two mutually dependent rationales: the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting an officer to liability where his position
requires him to exercise discretion; and the danger that the threat of liability would deter the
officer's willingness to exercise his office with the decisiveness and judgment required by the public good. 416 U.S. at 240.
35. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 434 (1976) (White, J., concurring). For an argument
advocating a literal interpretation of section 1983's "every person" language, see Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547, 558-67 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Immunily of FederalandState Judges, SUpra
note 7, at 737-40.
36. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 435-37 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
37. See, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308
(1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
38. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
39. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 434 (1976) (White, J., concurring); Barr v. Matteo, 360
U.S. 564 (1959); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
40. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976). See Comment, Section 1983, Immunity, and the Public Defender. The Misapplicationof 1mbler v. Pachtman, 55 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
477, 482-83 (1979); Delimiting the Scope of ProsecutorialImmunity, supra note 11, at 174.
41. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
553-54 (1967).
42. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,419 n.13 & 14 (1976); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
247-48 (1974). See NAHMOD, upra note 2, at ch. 8 for a general discussion of qualified immunity.
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ProsecutorialImmunity
Historically, the exercise of quasi-judicial discretion by an official
was one of the major criteria courts used in determining whether the
official should be immune from suit. 43 In Gregoire v. Biddle, 4 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit summed up the
reasoning behind this immunity: "[I]t has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to
subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation."

45

In Yaselli v. Goff,46 an early federal case which refers to "quasijudicial" immunity, the Second Circuit examined the history of immunity in Anglo-American law and concluded that a Special Assistant to
the Attorney General of the United States was immune from civil suit
for malicious prosecution, 47 regardless of the existence of malice on his
part, 48 or of the fact that the initial case against the plaintiff had resulted in a jury verdict of not guilty.49 Most appellate courts adopted
this position. °
The United States Supreme Court addressed the section 1983 immunity of the prosecutor in Imbler v. Pachtman.5 I The Court held that
a state prosecuting attorney who acted within the scope of his duties in
initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution was absolutely immune
from suit under section 1983 for alleged deprivations of constitutional
rights.5 2 Imbler sued the state prosecutor who had successfully prosecuted him for murder,5 3 alleging that the prosecutor knowingly used
54
perjured testimony and suppressed material evidence.
43. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926),
aff'dper curiam, 275 U.S. 503 (1927).
44. 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949).
45. Id at 581.
46. 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'dper curiam, 275 U.S. 503 (1927).
47. 12 F.2d at 399-405. The court stated that a United States Attorney exercises important
judicial functions and performs much the same role as a grand jury in deciding whether a particular prosecution should be instituted or followed up. If a prosecuting attorney knows that he may
have to defend an action for malicious prosecution in case of a failure to convict, his decision may
be influenced by that consideration. Id at 404.
48. Id at 406.
49. Id at 398.
50. See, e.g., Grow v. Fisher, 523 F.2d 875, 877 (7th Cir. 1975); Bethea v. Reid, 445 F.2d
1163, 1166 (3d Cir. 1971); Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1965); Gregoire v.
Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 580 (2d Cir. 1949). See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
837 (4th ed. 1971).
51. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
52. Id at 430-3 1.
53. Imbler had been freed by a federal district court after filing a habeas corpus petition. Id
at 415-16.
54. Id at 415.
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The Supreme Court noted in Imbler that the historical immunity
of a prosecutor is based on the same policies that underlie the traditional immunities of judges and grand jurors acting within the scope of
their duties. 55 The Court concluded that these public policy considerations warranted absolute immunity for prosecutors under section 1983
as well. 56 These considerations include concern that harrassment by
unfounded litigation would deflect the prosecutor's energies from his
duties and the possibility that threat of suit would influence the prosecutor to shade his decisions rather than exercise independent judgment. 57 The holding in 1mbler was expressly limited to situations in
which the alleged misconduct of the prosecutor occurred as part of the
initiation of a prosecution or the presentation of the State's case. 58 The
Court did not decide whether those aspects of a prosecutor's responsibilities which cast him in the role of administrator or investigator,
rather than advocate, require immunity.59
Justice White concurred in the Imbler holding that a prosecutor is
absolutely immune from suit for damages under section 1983 for knowing use of perjured testimony in the presentation of the government's
case. 60 He disapproved, however, of the majority decision in 1mbler to
extend to the prosecutor a broader immunity from section 1983 damage
suits than the common law immunity from malicious prosecution and
defamation suits. 6 ' Justice White disagreed with the majority opinion
55. Id at 422-23. The Court pointed out that some courts have remarked on the fact that
judges, grand jurors, and prosecutors all exercise discretionary judgment on the basis of evidence
presented to them. Id at 423 n.20.
56. Id at 424.
57. Id at 423. As Justice White pointed out in his concurring opinion in 1mbler, no one will
sue a prosecutor for an erroneous decision not to bring charges. If suits for malicious prosecution
were permitted, the prosecutors' inclination would always be to not bring charges. Id at 438
(White, J., concurring).
The Court listed additional reasons for applying the common law immunity to section 1983
suits: 1) the danger that suits which survived a pleadings challenge would pose to an honest
prosecutor; 2) the danger of virtual retrial of criminal offenses in the section 1983 suit; 3) the
adverse effect on the criminal justice system that limiting the prosecutor's discretion in conducting
the trial and presenting the evidence could have; and, 4) the availability of other remedies to
discipline prosecutors who abuse their discretion. Id at 424-27.
58. Id at 431.
59. Id at 430. In a footnote the Court said:
We recognize that the duties of the prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the
courtroom. . . . Preparation, both for the initiation of the criminal process and for a
trial, may require the obtaining, reviewing, and evaluating of evidence. At some point,
and with respect to some decisions, the prosecutor no doubt functions as an administrator rather than as an officer of the court. Drawing a proper line between these functions
may present difficult questions, but this case does not require us to anticipate them.
Id at 431 n.33.
60. Id. at 440 (White, J., concurring).
61. Id at 441.
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insofar as it implied an absolute immunity from suits for constitutional
violations other than those based on the prosecutor's decision to initiate

proceedings or his actions in bringing information or argument to the
court.62 He emphasized his particular disapproval of extending absolute immunity to the prosecutor in suits charging unconstitutional suppression of evidence. 63 Such an extension of immunity, Justice White
reasoned, would injure the judicial process and interfere with Congress'
purpose in enacting section 1983. 64
The Supreme Court's analysis in 1mbler addressed the prosecutor's immunity in his role as advocate. 65 The Court recognized that the
lines between advocacy, administration, and investigation are not always clear. 66 The two-part question still unresolved after Imbler was
whether the administrative or investigative functions of the prosecutor
also were entitled to immunity 67 and where the line separating advocacy from investigation or administration should be drawn. 68 The Sev69
enth Circuit addressed these questions in Hampton v. Hanrahan.
HAMPTON v HANiAIHAN

Facts and Procedure
On December 4, 1969, fourteen Chicago police officers detailed to
the Special Prosecution Unit 70 of the Cook County State's Attorney's
Office raided an apartment occupied by nine members of the Black
Panther Party. The officers were equipped with a search warrant for
62. Id
63. Id The absolute immunity traditionally extended to prosecutors in defamation cases is
designed to encourage them to bring information to the court which will resolve the case. "It
would stand this immunity rule on its head, however, to apply it to a suit based on a claim that the
prosecutor unconstitutionally withheld information from the court." Id at 442-43 (emphasis in
original).
64. Id at 433. The majority in 1mbler reasoned that as a practical matter, distinguishing
knowing use of perjured testimony from the deliberate withholding of exculpatory information
would be impossible. Because of the difficulty in distinguishing the two, the majority reasoned
that denying absolute immunity to suppression claims would eviscerate the absolute immunity
extended to claims of using perjured testimony. Id at 431 n.34.
65. Id. at 430-3 1.
66. Id at 431 n.33.
67. The courts which have considered this question appear to be answering it negatively.
See, e.g., Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1979); Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978).
68. See, e.g., Henzel v. Gerstein, 608 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1979); Helstocki v. Goldstein, 552
F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1977); Hall v. Flathead County Attorney, 478 F. Supp. 644 (D. Mont. 1979). See
NAHMOD, supra note 2, at 218-26 for a thorough discussion of Zmbler and the questions still
unanswered after the decision.
69. 600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3780 (U.S. June 2, 1980).
70. Hereinafter referred to as SPU.
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"sawed-off shotguns and other illegal weapons." 7 1 Upon the police en'72
try into the apartment, there was "an enormous burst of gunfire.
Two of the apartment's occupants, Black Panther leaders Fred Hampton and Mark Clark, died as a result of the gunfire. 7 3 Four of the re74
maining seven occupants were wounded.
Edward Hanrahan had been elected Cook County State's Attorney
in November of 1968, the same month that a Black Panther Party chapter opened in Chicago. 75 In the spring of 1969, Roy Mitchell, an FBI
agent assigned to the Chicago office's Racial Matters Squad, contacted
Richard Jalovec, an Assistant State's Attorney appointed and made
chief of the SPU by Hanrahan. Mitchell informed Jalovec that the FBI
had an informant, William O'Neal, within the Chicago Black
Panthers. 76 77
An FBI covert counterintelligence program designed to
"neutralize" a variety of political organizations, including the Black
Panther Party, was employing O'Neal to disrupt local Black Panther
programs. 78 During the summer and fall of 1969, tension between the
79
Black Panthers and Chicago law enforcement agencies escalated.
About December 1, 1969, Jalovec received from Mitchell a detailed floor plan of the apartment in which Hampton and several other
Black Panther members were living, together with a list of weapons
allegedly present in the apartment.8 0 Daniel Groth8 l and Jalovec met
with Hanrahan on December 3, and gave him the information on the
Black Panthers which they had received from the FBI.8 2 Jalovec told
Hanrahan that they intended to obtain a search warrant for Hampton's
71. 600 F.2d at 605.
72. Id
73. Id
74. Id
75. Id at 608-10.
76. Id at 609. The informant, O'Neal, was recruited by Mitchell. O'Neal joined the Chicago
chapter of the Black Panther Party as soon as it opened and soon became the local chief of security for the Panthers.
77. Id at 608. The program, called "Cointelpro" was set up in 1967, according to an FBI
memorandum, to "expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize the activities of
black nationalist, hate-type organizations and groupings, their leadership, spokesmen, membership, and supporters, and to counter their propensity for violence and civil disorder." NATIONAL
LAWYERS GUILD, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE: A DOCUMENTARY

LOOK AT AMERICA'S SECRET PO-

LICE 12 (3d ed. 1980) (emphasis deleted) [hereinafter referred to as COUNTERINTELLIGENCE].

78. 600 F.2d at 608-09.
79. Id at 610.
80. Id at 611. This information may or may not have come only from O'Neal; testimony
from plaintiffs and defendants at trial was in disagreement on this point, as on most others. Id at
611-12.
81. Groth was one of the Chicago police officers assigned to the SPU. He was next in command after Jalovec. Id at 610.
82. Id at 611-12.

1038
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apartment, which Jalovec and Groth then drafted. After the warrant
was issued, Jalovec approved Groth's decision to serve the warrant at
4:00 a.m. Jalovec then met with Hanrahan and explained the final plan
83
for the search of the apartment.
At 4:30 a.m. on December 4, seven police officers guarded the
apartment's exterior while seven more entered from the front and rear
doors. 84 A factual dispute exists as to the activity inside the apartment,
both during and immediately after the raid. 85 It is undisputed, however, that after Hampton had been shot several times in the head and
body, he was dragged dead from his bedroom; Clark also died as a
86
result of the gunfire.
After the raid, the police took the four wounded occupants of the
apartment to a hospital and incarcerated the three other survivors in
Cook County Jail. 87 Later on the day of the raid, Hanrahan issued a
statement to the press in which he adopted the raiders' version of the
incident, although he was aware of conflicting stories. 88
On December 8, Hanrahan called a second press conference, reiterating the raiders' account. At his request, the Chicago Tribune published an exclusive interview with the raiders on December 11. The
interview contained photographs provided by the State's Attorney's Office showing holes in walls and doors of the apartment which were represented by the State's Attorney's Office as caused by shots from guns
fired by the apartment occupants.8 9 On December 12, a reenactment of
the raid was filmed by CBS-TV. The film was edited not by CBS but
by the raiders. A set was constructed in the State's Attorney's Office
and Hanrahan, Jalovec, and the raiders were present during at least
part of the filming. 90 On December 13, Hanrahan held yet another
press conference, in which he again confirmed the accuracy of the of83. Id. at 612.
84. All were Chicago police officers detailed to the Cook County State's Attorney's Office.
Id at 606. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
85. The apartment's surviving occupants depicted what occurred as a violent, unprovoked
attack on the apartment, and testified at trial that the police officers did not announce their purpose when they arrived at the apartment. The apartment occupants denied that they fired on the
police. The survivors further claimed that they were physically and verbally abused by the police
in the apartment after the raid. The police officers testified at trial that they were fired upon from

within the apartment, after having properly announced their purpose to the occupants while on
the apartment porch. The disagreement between the survivors' testimony and that of the police on
the facts of the raid is almost total. 600 F.2d at 613-15.
86. Id at 605, 615.

87. Id at 616.
88. Id

89. Id
90. Id at 616-17.
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ficers' story, despite questions from the media.9 ' Throughout this pe92
riod, the Chicago FBI agents kept in touch with Jalovec and Groth.
On December 12, Hanrahan asked the Chicago Police Superintendent to initiate an internal police investigation. The police officers
placed in charge of the investigation were informed by their superiors
that the inquiry would be limited in scope, designed to justify the raiders' use of force, and that all of the raiders' statements were to be identical.93 Groth was shown the prearranged questions and answers taken
from the official police report and then was asked to give his account of
the raid. Jalovec and two other Assistant State's Attorneys were then
shown the questions and answers. The raiders then met with two of the
Assistant State's Attorneys and were also shown the prepared material
and Groth's statement. The Assistant State's Attorneys were present at
the Internal Investigation Division 94 interviews. 9 5
In January of 1970, a Cook County grand jury returned an indictment for attempted murder and aggravated battery against the seven
survivors of the raid. Hanrahan was responsible for the presentation of
96
evidence to the grand jury.
In March, Hanrahan learned that an independent ballistics expert
had conducted extensive tests and discovered that the shells previously
identified by a Chicago Police ballistics analyst as being fired from inside the apartment had actually been fired from police officers' weapons. The Chicago Crime Laboratory repeated their tests, also firing the
raiders' weapons for the first time, and confirmed the independent expert's findings. 9 7 On May 4, 1970, Hanrahan informed a federal grand
jury convened to investigate possible violations of the apartment occupants' civil rights9 8 that the charges against the surviving Black
Panthers would be dropped. 99
The seven survivors and the mothers of Fred Hampton and Mark
91. Id
92. Id During this period, the FBI agents also requested a bonus payment for O'Neal, who
had provided them with the information given to Hanrahan's office before the raid. Id at 617;
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, supra note 77, at 44.

93. 600 F.2d at 617.
94. Hereinafter referred to as liD.
95. 600 F.2d at 617.
96. Id at 618.
97. Id at 619. Chicago Crime Laboratory personnel had incorrectly identified shells which
actually came from police officers' guns as coming from those of the apartment occupants. None
of the police officers' guns were tested by the laboratory in its initial ballistics tests. Id at 618.
98. Id at 618.
99. Id at 620. The indictments against the survivors were dropped by Hanrahan four days
after his appearance before the federal grand jury. No indictments were returned and the federal
grand jury was discharged on May 15, 1970. Id
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Clark filed four separate civil rights actions in 1970 against a number of
city and state officials, including Hanrahan, Jalovec, the police officers
involved in the raid, and the police officers involved in the lID investigation. These actions were consolidated in an amended complaint filed
in the federal district court in 1972.100
The trial court dismissed the complaint against all the defendants
except the fourteen police officers who actually participated in the raid.
Judge Perry held that the plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action
and further held that the State's Attorneys were protected by quasijudicial immunity.' 0 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed in Hampton v. City of Chicago, 10 2 holding that the
plaintiffs' allegations respecting the planning and execution of the raid
were sufficient to state a claim under sections 1983 and 1985(3). 103 The
Seventh Circuit further held that the alleged participation of the prosecuting attorneys in the planning and execution of the raid was not
quasi-judicial conduct, and therefore was entitled to only the qualified
immunity granted to police officers. °4
In December of 1974, plaintiffs amended their complaint, joining
100. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants, in planning and executing the raid and conspiring to
illegally arrest, falsely imprison, and maliciously prosecute the survivors, committed acts under
color of state law which deprived plaintiffs of the rights guaranteed by the first, fourth, fifth,
eighth, ninth, thirteenth, and fourteenth amendments, and protected by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
1985(3), and 1986. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants acted both individually and in conspiracy
with each other to accomplish the deprivation.
101. Hampton v. City of Chicago, 339 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. 111.1972), rev'd, 484 F.2d 602 (7th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974). Judge Perry held that, in their quasi-judicial character and function, Hanrahan and his assistants were entitled to the same common law immunity as
that given the judiciary. Further, he stated that plaintiffs did not present sufficient allegations that
the defendants engaged in investigatory conduct other than that necessary to perform their quasijudicial function. Judge Perry held that the plaintiffs' allegations were conclusory and lacked a
factual showing of malice or lack of good faith. Id. at 701.
102. 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case against the City of Chicago, Cook County, the
mayor, and the superintendent of police. 484 F.2d at 611. The Seventh Circuit limited its review
to whether the plaintiffs alleged any sufficient claim for relief, and therefore did not discuss the
State's Attorneys' post-raid activity. See id. at 606.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1976) states, in pertinent part:
for the purpose of deprivIf two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire ..
ing, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of
the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws, . . . the party so injured
or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury
or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
104. 484 F.2d at 608-09. The court relied on the distinction made in Robichaud v. Ronan, 351
F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965):
[Wihen a prosecuting attorney acts in some capacity other than his quasi-judicial capacity, then the reason for his immunity-integral relationship between his acts and the
judical process---ceases to exist. If he acts in the role of a policeman, then why should he
not be liable, as is the policeman, if, in so acting, he has deprived the plaintiff of rights,
privileges or immunities secured by the Federal Constitution and laws?
Id at 536.
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four federal defendants connected with the Chicago FBI office, including Mitchell and O'Neal. 0 5 Trial began in January of 1976 and lasted
approximately eighteen months. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' evidence, Judge Perry granted the defendants' motion for a directed verdict for all except the seven police officers directly participating in the
shooting. 0 6 The case against the seven remaining defendants was submitted at its conclusion to a jury, which deadlocked. Judge Perry then
t0 7
directed verdicts in favor of the remaining defendants.
Reasoning of the Court
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed on most of the counts,
holding that the lower court erred in directing verdicts for the defendants. 0 8 The Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence to support their claims of individual liability and
conspiracy under sections 1983, 1985(3), and 1986.109 The court found
that the plaintiffs had established causes of action for the defendants'
pre-raid and post-raid conduct, as well as for the deprivation of rights
which occurred during the raid."10 The Seventh Circuit then addressed
the absolute immunity claimed by the state and federal officials for
their actions in connection with the raid."'I
The Seventh Circuit stated that requests from public officials for
immunity for their official wrongdoing must be treated with circumspection. 12 The court reasoned that the claims of Hanrahan and his
105. 600 F.2d at 606.
106. id The federal district court ruled that the plaintiffs had not established a prima facie
case of conspiracy or joint venture.
107. ld
108. Id at 608. The court held that a motion for a directed verdict must be denied if the
evidence shows that reasonable persons might draw differing conclusions therefrom, which was
the case in Hampton.
The plaintiffs' amended complaint contained seventeen counts. Plaintiffs did not appeal
Judge Perry's dismissal of counts twelve and thirteen, which had charged the City of Chicago and
Cook County with deprivation of the civil rights of the occupants of the apartment. Id. at 607.
There were twenty-eight defendants named in one or more of the fifteen counts which plaintiffs appealed, including three FBI agents and their informant, Hanrahan and three Assistant
State's Attorneys, Groth and the twelve other police officers who participated in the raid (one
officer had died and the cause had been dismissed as to him in 1972, id at 605 n.1), and seven
defendants connected either with the Chicago Police Crime Laboratory or the lID. Id at 606-07.
109. Id at 620-26. The court held that the state officials supplied the requisite color of state
law, thus making the entire alleged conspiracy actionable under section 1983, including the part
played by the federal defendants. Id. at 623. See note I supra.
110. 600 F.2d at 625-26. Plaintiffs contended that the failure of Hanrahan and Jalovec to
properly supervise the SPU officers created another cause of action under 1983. The Seventh
Circuit agreed, holding that the plaintiffs' allegation of intentional or reckless disregard for their
rights in the failure to supervise comprised a cause of action. Id. at 626 & n.25.
Ill. Id at631.
112. Id The court stated:
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three assistants to absolute immunity under Imbler were misplaced.
Imbler, according to the Seventh Circuit, held only that a prosecutor
has absolute immunity in initiating a prosecution and presenting the
State's case." l3 The Hampton court noted that the Supreme Court in
Imbler left standing several federal appellate court decisions which focused on the nature of the prosecutor's complained of activity rather
than his status. 114 These decisions held that certain actions by state
prosecutors are entitled only to qualified immunity, indicating that
when a prosecutor is performing investigative rather than advocacy
functions, he is not entitled to absolute immunity. 1 15
The Seventh Circuit reiterated its ruling in Hampton v. City of Chicago' 16 that prosecutors have no greater claim to complete immunity
for their alleged participation in the planning and execution of a raid of
this sort than do the police officers acting under their direction. 1'7 The
Seventh Circuit held that neither Imbler v. Pachtman,118 decided after
Hampton v. City of Chicago, nor the evidence produced at trial led to a
different decision.' 19 The court concluded that defendants' pre-raid activity was not within the meaning of advocacy as used in Imbler.
The defendants' claims to immunity for their post-raid conduct
presented a more complicated question. The Seventh Circuit found
that Hanrahan's decision to file charges, his presentation of evidence to
the grand jury, and his decision to drop the charges were all part of his
duties in initiating and presenting the State's case, and clearly were absolutely immune under Imbler. 20 The defendants' post-raid publicity
activity, however, which may have encouraged both pre-trial prejudice
to the plaintiffs and the alleged coverup, was held not protected by abWe should be hesitant to expand the scope of official activity which, from the perspective
of a victim seeking civil redress, stands beyond the constraints of the Constitution ...
For us to hold that all of the actions of the defendants in this case should be immune
from liability as a matter of law would require us to expand radically the parameters
which the Supreme Court has set for the doctrine of official immunity. This we are
unwilling to do.
Id

113. Id at 631. The Seventh Circuit also cited Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir.
1977), holding that the prosecutors' immunity was limited to advocacy functions.
114.

600 F.2d at 631.

115. Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249, 1256 (1st Cir. 1974); Hampton v. City of Chicago,
484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974); Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d
533, 536-37 (9th Cir. 1965).
116. 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974).
117. 600 F.2d at 632.
118.

424 U.S. 409 (1976).

119. 600 F.2d at 632.
120. Id The court held that any Assistant State's Attorneys who aided Hanrahan in these
phases of his post-raid activity were also absolutely immune from civil liability for their conduct.
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solute immunity. 121
The Hampton court concluded that nothing in Butz v. Economou 12 2 or Imbler suggested that a state prosecutor's publicity activity
should be absolutely immune from civil liability. The Seventh Circuit
noted that the Supreme Court in Butz justified its extension of absolute
immunity to "quasi-judicial" actions of administrative prosecutors
partly because of the scrutiny which a prosecutor's discretionary decisions receive in the adjudicatory process.123 This scrutiny was absent in
the publicity context of Hampton. 124 The Seventh Circuit likewise read
Imbler as not protecting a prosecutor's "publicity campaigns."' 12 5 The
court reasoned that allowing only a qualified immunity for a prosecutor's public relations activities would undermine neither the prosecutor's judgment in bringing and conducting suits nor the functioning of
the criminal justice system as a whole. 126 Accordingly, only a qualified
immunity applied to Hanrahan's post-raid press conferences and to the
participation of Hanrahan and Jalovec in the Chicago Tribune inter127
view and the CBS-TV reenactment.
In Hampton v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit had held that
the Assistant State's Attorneys were entitled to only qualified immunity
from liability for their participation in the Chicago Police Department
lID investigation. 128 After Imbler, however, the Seventh Circuit had
found absolute immunity in Heidelberg v. Hammer129 for prosecutors
who allegedly cooperated with local police in falsifying a line-up report
and destroying police tapes of incoming phone calls in connection with
a murder trial. The court found that the conduct of the Assistant
State's Attorneys in Hampton during the lID investigation was essentially indistinguishable from that held to be absolutely immune in Heidelberg.130 The Seventh Circuit accordingly held the Assistant State's
Attorneys to be absolutely immune from liability for their actions in
connection with the liD investigation. 131
121. Id
122. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). The Seventh Circuit relied on the Rutz holding that an official
whose public relations activity allegedly violated specific statutory and constitutional guarantees is
not covered by the absolute immunity extended in Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
123. 600 F.2d at 633, quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 516-17 (1978).
124. 600 F.2d at 633.
125. Id
126. Id
127. Id
128. Id at 609. The court said that, in substance, the plaintiffs were alleging the deliberate
preparation of perjured testimony. Id at 609 n.9.
129. 577 F.2d 429, 432 (7th Cir. 1978).
130. 600 F.2d at 633.
131. Id
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The federal defendants in Hampton also claimed immunity for
their actions.132 Section 1983 requires that the complained of action be
performed under color of state law.1 33 Therefore, federal officials are
not amenable to suit under section 1983 unless they conspire with a
person who provides the requisite color of state law. 34 Once plaintiffs
show a conspiracy, 35 the court must face the question of the federal
defendants' immunity.
The Seventh Circuit dismissed the federal defendants' reliance on
Barr v. Matteo 36 for their claim to absolute immunity. The court reiterated the Supreme Court's statement in Butz v. Economou 13 7 that Barr
does not afford protection to a federal official who has exceeded an
express statutory or constitutional limitation on his authority.1 38 Because plaintiffs had presented evidence to support their allegations that
the federal defendants violated both constitutional and statutory limitations on their authority, the absolute immunity granted to federal officials in Barr did not apply in this case.' 39 The Seventh Circuit noted
that Butz held that federal officials should receive no more protection
from liability for violating an individual's civil rights than do their state
counterparts. 40 The federal defendants in this case were operating as
law enforcement officials investigating potential wrongdoing. The Seventh Circuit noted that Pierson v. Ray' 4' established the rule that such
activity by state law enforcement officials warrants only qualified immunity. Therefore, the court held that the federal officials in this case
142
were entitled to only qualified immunity.
The test of qualified immunity on remand, the court said, should
be that used in Procunier v. Navarette. 43 If the constitutional right
which the defendants allegedly violated was clearly established at the
time of the conduct, and if the defendants knew or should have known
132. Id at 631.
133. See Adickes v. Kress, 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970). See also notes 1 and 109 supra.
134. Adickes v. Kress, 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970).
135. See note 109 supra.
136. 360 U.S. 564 (1959). The Supreme Court held in Barr that a federal official who, even
maliciously, issues a false and damaging publication, is absolutely immune from liability for libel
if the issuance of the publication is within the parameters of his official duties.
137. 438 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1978).
138. 600 F.2d at 634.
139. Id
140. Id In Butz, the Supreme Court held that, in the absence of congressional direction to the
contrary, there was no basis for differentiating betwen the immunities accorded state and federal
officials when sued for the same constitutional violation. See text accompanying notes 26-28
supra.
141. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).

142. 600 F.2d at 634.
143. 434 U.S. 555, 562 (1978).
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of the right, or knew or should have known that their conduct violated
the constitutional norm, the doctrine of qualified immunity would not
thwart the recovery of damages.'" The United States Supreme Court
in Procunier stated that qualified immunity is not available where the
defendant official has acted with malicious intent to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right or cause him other injury.145 A determination of whether the defendants' actions are immune under this test, the
court held, must await retrial.
In a concurring opinion, Chief Judge Fairchild, without explanation, advocated limiting the holding that a prosecutor is not entitled to
absolute immunity while performing "investigative" functions to the
146
functions of the prosecutor defendants described in Hampton.
Reasoning of the Dissent
In a separate opinion, Judge Pell 47 concurred with the majority
that the directed verdict as to the officers who actually did the shooting
in the raid was improper because of the issue of the possible use of
excessive force.' 48 Judge Pell dissented, however, as to the reversal of
the trial court's directed verdicts in favor of the remaining defendants.
While Judge Pell admitted that 1mbler left open the question of absolute immunity for the administrative and investigative roles of the prosecutor, he reasoned that the Seventh Circuit should extend absolute
14 9
immunity to cover the State's Attorneys' conduct in Hampton.
Judge Pell argued that the prosecuting attorneys' involvement in
public statements and media publicity was of a less egregious nature
than other conduct that has been found to be absolutely immune where
prosecutors were engaged directly in the prosecutorial process. The
conduct here, the dissent reasoned, was so intimately related to the
15
prosecutorial process that absolute immunity should protect it. 0
144. 600 F.2d at 634-35.
145. Id
146. Id at 649 (Fairchild, J., concurring).
147. In October of 1979, it was revealed that Judge Pell had been an FBI special agent from
1942 to 1945 and a member of an FBI alumni group until 1977. Chicago Sun-Times, October 19,
1979, at 40. This information, while not part of Judge Pel's official biography issued by the clerk
of the court, had been made public previously in Who'r Who in America. Plaintiffs moved that
Judge Pell be recused from all further proceedings and that his dissent be stricken. Chicago Lawyer, November 1979, at 18. The Chicago Lawyer reported that it is standard practice in the Seventh Circuit for recusal motions to be submitted to the judge being challenged. Judge Pell denied
the motion on November 15, 1979. Respondents Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Petitions for
Writs of Certiorari at 25.
148. 600 F.2d at 661 (Pen, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
149. Id at 661-62.
150. Id at 662.
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Judge Pell characterized Hanrahan's media activity as a "counterattack" to the adverse publicity his office was receiving, done for the
purpose of avoiding the adverse effect on the criminal justice system
15
about which the Supreme Court was concerned in Imbler. 1
ANALYSIS

Prior to Imbler, several circuit courts of appeals had attempted to
delineate the prosecutor's immunity by focusing on whether or not the
challenged activity was illegal and therefore outside the scope of the
official's jurisdiction. 52 This approach clearly was unworkable after
Imbler because the immunity granted in Imbler makes no distinction
between legal and illegal acts. 53 After Imbler, a court must focus on
the function the prosecutor performs in order to delineate the extent of
the immunity. To the extent that the function is quasi-judicial-that of
an advocate initiating a prosecution or presenting the State's case-the
prosecutor is absolutely immune from damages liability under section
1983.154

The basis for the Supreme Court decision in Imbler was an overriding concern for the proper functioning of the criminal justice system. 155 The Court reasoned that the public trust of the prosecutor's
office would suffer if he were potentially liable in damages for his decisions. 156 This, in turn, would adversely affect the system's goal of accurately determining guilt or innocence. 57 Because the prosecutor's
advocacy functions are an integral part of the judicial process, 158 the
Court found that they require absolute immunity.
Yet any grant of absolute immunity from liability frustrates the
purpose of section 1983 by limiting the state action it can reach. Congress intended section 1983 as a remedial statute designed to combat
151. Id
152. See, e.g., Hilliard v. Williams, 516 F.2d 1344 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated,424 U.S. 961 (1976)

(remanded for further consideration in light of 1mbler). See generally Delimiting the Scope of
ProsecutorialImmunity, supra note 11, at 183-87.
153. See 424 U.S. at 430-31. Thus, after 1mbler, a prosecutor has been held to be absolutely
immune when he allegedly conspired to bring false criminal charges, Perez v. Borchers, 567 F.2d
285 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); or when he allegedly instructed a witness to testify falsely, Hilliard v. Williams, 540 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); or when he allegedly conspired with
police to falsify a line-up report, Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1978). See also
Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213, 1221-22 (3d Cir. 1977).
154. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976).
155. Id at 427-28.
156. Id at 424.
157. Id at 426.
158. Id at 430.
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deprivations of civil rights. 59 Thus, the apparent intent of Congress,
expressed through the absolute "every person" language of section
1983,160 must be balanced against the need for official performance uninfluenced by threat of vexatious ligitation. In any immunity analysis,
the court must balance the deprivation to the individual who is denied
a remedy against the interest of governmental efficiency. Depending
upon whether one views the least possible interference with the intent
of section 1983 or the least possible interference with the legislative and
judicial systems as more desirable, the result of the balance will change.
Too great a concern with efficiency will lead to limitations on liability
which will leave unprotected the interests which Congress intended the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 to safeguard.
Courts must consider the danger of destroying the effectiveness of
section 1983 as a remedial statute while applying Imbler. Interpreting
the prosecutorial function too broadly would destroy section 1983 as a
check on unscrupulous prosecutors.' 6 1 Imbler should be read narrowly

to avoid this result. 162
Historically, the Seventh Circuit has been reluctant to expand the
scope of absolute immunity from section 1983 liability as applied to
judges and prosecutors. 6 3 Continuing this policy, the Seventh Circuit
in Hampton properly delineated the prosecutor's advocacy function
narrowly, with one exception. The court also correctly refused to extend absolute immunity from liability to federal officials when comparable state officials merited only qualified immunity from liability.
FederalDefendants
The federal defendants in Hampton, three FBI agents and their
paid informant O'Neal, sought absolute immunity for their actions.
They characterized their participation in the events leading to Hampton as that of "law enforcement officials investigating potential wrong159. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 558-67 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
160. See note I supra.
161. The other procedures commonly noted as checks on unscrupulous prosecutors, such as
post-trial review and discipline by the bar, may be of limited utility to an individual wronged by a
prosecutor with broad immunity.
162. The Supreme Court has stated that immunity should be granted only where it is essential
for the conduct of the public business. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978).

In Ferri v.

Ackerman, 100 S. Ct. 402 (1979), the Supreme Court held that federal law does not mandate
absolute immunity for court-appointed counsel in a malpractice suit brought by his former client.
163.

See, e.g., Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub norn. Stump v.

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974).

But cf.Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1978) (per

curiam) (holding a public defender to be absolutely immune from section 1983 claims).
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doing."' 164 The plaintiffs charged the federal defendants with violating
65
both constitutional and statutory limitations on their authority.'
Given the Supreme Court's holding in Pierson v. Ray 166 granting
only qualified immunity to police defendants in a section 1983 suit, and
the holding in Butz v. Economout167 mandating the same degree of immunity for federal defendants as that granted their state counterparts in
section 1983 suits, the Seventh Circuit's extension of only qualified immunity to the federal defendants in Hampton was correct. Law enforcement officers were never granted absolute immunity at common
law. They perform none of the legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial
functions which merit absolute immunity. To grant only qualified immunity to the local law enforcement officials involved in the raid while
granting absolute immunity to the federal law enforcement officials
would make no sense and would create the very inequity the Supreme
Court attempted to avoid in Butz.
State Defendants
The activities for which the state defendants sought immunity
were more varied than those of the federal defendants. The Seventh
Circuit in Hampton applied the functional approach to a wide variety
of prosecutorial activities. The State's Attorney's Office sought immunity for four separate activites: 1) the filing of charges against the survivors of the raid, presentation of evidence to a grand jury, and the
eventual dropping of charges; 2) the presentation of the State's Attorney's version of the events after the fact to the media; 3) the planning,
execution, and supervision of the raid against the Black Panther Party;
and, 4) the actions of the Assistant State's Attorneys involved with the
liD investigation.
The Seventh Circuit correctly applied Imbler in finding absolute
immunity for the State's Attorney's actions in charging the Black
Panthers, presenting evidence to the grand jury, and dropping the
charges. These activities are quintessential quasi-judicial functions
which fit snugly into Imbler's definition of absolutely immune conduct.
To open the prosecutor's decision to bring or drop charges to civil liability, no matter what the prosecutor's motive, would indeed jeopardize
the functioning of the criminal justice system. The purpose of absolute
immunity is as much to protect the immune official from the complica164.
165.
166.
167.

600 F.2d at 634.
Id
386 U.S. 547, 555-57 (1967).
438 U.S. 478 (1978).
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tions of a trial arising from his actions as it is to protect him from the
outcome of the trial. 168 If every person charged by a prosecuting attorney was able to sue for malicious prosecution, the system would soon
grind to a halt.
While the Supreme Court in Imbler noted that the prosecutor in
his role as advocate frequently acts outside the courtroom as well as in
it, the Court acknowledged that at some point the prosecutor functions
as an administrator rather than as an officer of the court. 169 The Sev-

enth Circuit correctly held the State's Attorney's media activities to be
such a nonadvocacy function, protected only by qualified immunity.
The State's Attorney's presentation to the public of his office's role
and point of view in a controversial event is an administrative function.
There is no direct connection between a State's Attorney's press conferences called to defend the police activities of his subordinates and his
role as an advocate. 70 In defending the propriety of his office's actions
and the veracity of the SPU personnel in the media, Hanrahan was
engaged in public relations. Department heads and press secretaries
perform such a function daily. To attempt to claim any relationship
between these activities and the preparation, initiation, or prosecution
of a trial would make a mockery of the rationale enunciated in Imbler
7
for extending absolute immunity.' '
In his Hampton dissent, Judge Pell argued that the media activity
of the State's Attorney should be absolutely immune because it was a
"counter-attack" designed to avoid an adverse effect on the functioning
of the criminal justice system. 172 But the Supreme Court in Imbler
made it clear that the adverse effect they were attempting to avoid
through immunity was the crippling of the prosecutor through unfounded litigation or fear of potential liability for decisions to prosecute, not an adverse effect caused by bad publicity.
While the prosecuting attorney's orchestration of press conferences
in a context such as Hampton clearly is not entitled to absolute immunity, the pre-raid activities of the State's Attorney's Office present a
168. Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1208 (3d Cir. 1979).
169. 424 U.S. at 431 n.33. For example, the State's Attorney certainly is not performing an
advocacy function when hiring or disciplining personnel.
170. See, e.g., Helstoski v. Goldstein, 552 F.2d 564, 565-66 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding that deliberate leaks by a prosecutor of false information about plaintiff to the press would not be protected
under 1mbler).
171. In his concurring opinion in 1mbler, Justice White points out the danger inherent in
extending absolute immunity too liberally to state officials. See notes 60-64 and accompanying
text supra.
172. 600 F.2d at 662.
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more difficult question. Arguably, some evidence gathering and investigative functions of the State's Attorney are quasi-judicial because
they are inextricably connected with the initiation and presentation of
the State's case. 17 3 Yet at some point a prosecutor's activity is so far
removed from his advocacy function that it is much closer to police
work, which is protected only by qualified immunity. 74 This was the
case in Hampton.
The State's Attorney's Office in Hampton was working with the
FBI in conducting a long-term, far-reaching investigation into the activities of a political group, as opposed to investigating a specific crime.
It is well-established that the law enforcement officials involved in such
a raid are entitled only to qualified immunity. 17 5 Not only would it be
unjust to extend absolute immunity to the planners while extending
only qualified immunity to the local police who followed their orders, it
would undermine the public policy behind limiting the extension of
absolute immunity. The criminal justice system might well function
more efficiently from an administrative point of view if carte blanche
were given to State's Attorneys and police in investigating possible
"subversive" or criminal activity, but this does not appear to be what
the framers of the Constitution or the Supreme Court in Imbler had in
mind. To extend absolute immunity in this situation would give the
prosecutor immunity for conduct which would not be immune if done
by other law enforcement officials. Because a court could hardly hold a
subordinate liable under section 1983 for actions ordered by an immune superior, the potential for abuse in such a situation would be
substantial. The Seventh Circuit correctly refused to extend absolute
immunity to the State's Attorneys for their pre-raid activities.
The Seventh Circuit in Hampton found the Assistant State's Attorneys absolutely immune from liability for their conduct during the IID
investigation. This extension of absolute immunity was unwarranted
173. In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 n.33 (1976), the Supreme Court noted that
performance of a prosecutor's advocacy function may require "the obtaining, reviewing, and evaluating of evidence." This language has reinforced speculation that the investigatory role of the
prosecutor may eventually be accorded absolute immunity because of the difficulty in drawing a
satisfactory line between the investigative and advocate roles. See NAHMOD, supra note 2, at 22425.
A recent attempt to determine when a prosecuting attorney's investigatory work is part of his
advocacy function was made by the Third Circuit in Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203 (3d
Cir. 1979). In Forsyth, the Third Circuit held that, only to the extent that the securing of information is necessary to a prosecutor's decision to initiate a criminal prosecution, is it absolutely immune. Id at 1215. The court admitted that a factual inquiry might well be necessary to
determine in what role the challenged function was exercised.
174. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
175. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
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under Imbler. In substance, the plaintiffs alleged that the Assistant
State's Attorneys deliberately prepared perjured testimony.' 76 This
conduct would be immune under 1mbler if performed in connection
with initiating a prosecution or presenting the State's case. 177 But, in
Hampton, the Assistant State's Attorneys allegedly prepared perjured
testimony in connection with a Chicago Police Department internal investigation. The investigation was undertaken to determine whether
any disciplinary action was warranted against the fourteen police officers who had taken part in the raid on Hampton's apartment. 7 8 The
Chicago police officers were to present this testimony to the Chicago
Police Department investigators, not under oath in a courtroom at a
trial.
The Seventh Circuit correctly found the conduct which the Assistant State's Attorneys engaged in concerning the lID investigation to be
essentially indistinguishable from that engaged in by the prosecutor in
Heidelberg v. Hammer.17 9 The context in which the conduct was performed, however, is distinguishable. The prosecutor in Heidelberg was
engaged in initiating and presenting the State's case in connection with
a murder trial. The Assistant State's Attorneys in Hampton allegedly
were aiding and encouraging the police in lying to their superiors, not a
trial judge. Even if a police department finding that disciplinary action
against the officers was warranted would later have discredited the police officers' testimony at the Black Panthers' criminal trial, 8 0 the alleged conduct is one step further away from being an integral part of
the judicial process than was the conduct in Heidelberg. To extend absolute immunity to the conduct of the Assistant State's Attorneys in
connection with the IID investigation does not aid the functioning of
the criminal justice system in accurately determining guilt or innocence; it merely opens another avenue for abuse. Under this extension
of immunity, a prosecutor could arrange perjury in a trial to which he
had no connection as an advocate merely to insure that a potential witness in a trial he was prosecuting later would have an unblemished
record.
The Seventh Circuit did not explain its reasons for holding the
Assistant State's Attorneys' conduct in connection with the lID investi176. Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 609 n.9 (7th Cir. 1973), cer. denied, 415 U.S.
917 (1974).
177. 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976).
178. 600 F.2d at 618.
179. 577 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1978). See text accompanying notes 129-31 supra.
180. At this time, the surviving occupants of the apartment were still under indictment. 600
F.2d at 616-20.
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gation to be absolutely immune other than noting the resemblance of
the conduct to that which was held to be immune in Heidelberg. The
danger of this holding is its ease of extension. It focuses on the act
allegedly done rather than on either the function the prosecutor was
performing at the time or the policy behind extending immunity in 1mbler. Under this approach, any act done by a prosecutor would be absolutely immune, regardless of circumstances, if a similar act had ever
previously been found to be immune.
The Seventh Circuit's extension of absolute immunity from liability in this situation broadened the limits of the prosecutor's advocacy
function beyond the requirements of Imbler, and was not necessary to
protect the prosecutor's discretion in initiating and presenting the
18
State's case at trial. '
CONCLUSION

Section 1983 assures a remedy to individuals whose constitutional
or statutory rights are abused by persons acting under color of state
law. The United States Supreme Court has carved out limited exceptions to this liability, granting absolute immunity to state officials in
some circumstances.
The Seventh Circuit in Hampton v. Hanrahan was faced with
claims of wholesale absolute immunity by a variety of state and federal
officials. The court exhibited a laudable concern with balancing the
policies involved in the grant of absolute immunity to prosecutors and
the policies behind section 1983. The court's attempt to delineate the
advocacy function of the prosecutor was correct, as was its holding that
federal law enforcement officials were entitled only to a qualified immunity.
For the most part, the Seventh Circuit in Hampton set valid limits
on absolute prosecutorial immunity, which should help circumscribe
illegitimate behavior by prosecutors in the future. The court erred,
however, in extending absolute immunity to the Assistant State's Attorneys' alleged actions in connection with the lID investigation. The
Seventh Circuit's focus on the act involved rather than on function or
policy was incorrect. Future decisions on prosecutorial immunity
181. In Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320 (1975), the Supreme Court discussed the need to
balance the increased discretion of the official receiving absolute immunity against the absence of
a remedy for persons subject to intentional or otherwise inexcusable deprivations. This balance,
applied to the lID situation, would mandate an extension of only qualified immunity.
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should focus carefully on function and policy rather than make a superficial comparison of activities.
MARY ROSE STRUBBE

